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The third wave of democratization that hit the African con-
tinent in the early 1990s has in many countries not resulted in
long-term democratic development. By the early 2000s it had
become clear that in many African countries political liberal-
ization was not followed by democracy but by a new form
of authoritarianism—dominant party systems (Hadenius &
Teorell, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni & Kricheli,
2010). In these regimes a ruling party has strongly entrenched
itself in power. These regimes establish formal democratic
institutions (i.e., regular elections), but without introducing
meaningful political competition. In this regard, developments
in Sub-Saharan Africa are consistent with a global trend:
macro-analyses ﬁnd that since the early 1990s dominant party
systems constitute by far the largest category of authoritarian-
ism and about one third of all political regimes worldwide
(Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010).
Since the early 2000s, the EU has considerably developed its
instruments to support democratic reforms in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Beyond aid and trade sanctions, the EU has developed
a range of instruments that allow it to set incentives for polit-
ical openings or prevent degradations in political liberalization
in African countries. However, the prospects for external
actors to use political conditionality to support reforms in
dominant party systems remain unclear. Research on political
conditionality has often concerned itself with (conﬂicting)
donor interests and (a lack of) donor coordination to explain
why conditionality does not work (Crawford, 2001;
Emmanuel, 2010). This research does not focus on the chances
of success of supporting political reforms in speciﬁc types of
authoritarian regimes such as dominant party systems. On
the other hand, research on authoritarian regimes has long
concentrated on the domestic factors of authoritarian longev-
ity. Only recently have scholars become more interested in the
eﬀects of political conditionality in authoritarian regimes.
These studies suggest that general development aid contributes
to democratization in authoritarian regimes with a large ruling
coalition such as dominant party systems (Wright, 2009).
However, democracy aid seems to have a positive eﬀect only
in single-party regimes; no eﬀect could be detected for domi-
nant party systems (Cornell, 2012). Moreover, this research85provides limited insights into diﬀerences among dominant
party systems.
This article contributes to these discussions on the eﬀective-
ness of political conditionality in authoritarian regimes (see
Bader & Faust, 2014 for an overview) by focusing on the ‘re-
ceiving end’ of political conditionality. The article examines
two dominant party systems—Ethiopia and Rwanda—that
are similarly (aid) dependent on the EU, but where the willing-
ness of the government to engage with the EU on democratic
reforms has varied widely during 2000 and 2012. In both cases,
the EU has refrained from using sanctions, but has sought to
combine development aid, democracy aid and dialog to sup-
port political reforms. In both Ethiopia and Rwanda, govern-
ments reluctantly started to engage with the EU on political
reforms in the early 2000s. Since the mid-2000s, Rwanda has
willingly, and at times even pro-actively, engaged with the
EU. Ethiopia, in contrast, remained highly reluctant to engage
on political reforms; it only became more forthcoming in 2011.
How to explain these diﬀerences in the willingness of govern-
ments in African dominant party systems to engage with the
EU on democratic reforms?
Bridging research on authoritarian regimes and aid condi-
tionality, this article puts forward two main arguments. It
shows that the interplay between the government and (poten-
tial) opponents is a key variable that inﬂuences not only the
government’s strategies of using coercion, but also its willing-
ness to engage with the EU on political reforms. The interac-
tion between government and opponents thereby creates ways
for the EU and other external actors to support political open-
ings and counter political closures. Yet, the article shows that
even though the EU has considerably developed its instru-
ments to support political reforms since the early 2000s, it
has not been strategic in responding to this dynamic. The
EU exerts pressure at times when the government uses
high-intensity coercion and cannot permit higher levels of
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times when the government has more leeway to engage and to
allow for political liberalization, the EU has diﬃculties using
the opportunity to promote reforms.
The two following sections will develop the theoretical argu-
ment. Section four uses the examples of Ethiopia and Rwanda
as an illustration of the theoretical argument. The empirical
analysis draws on research from area studies, an extensive
review of EU documents, and minutes of aid policy dialogs
between donors and both governments. This information is
triangulated with about 45 interviews conducted during 2009
and 2013 with representatives of the EU and member states,
Ethiopian and Rwandan government oﬃcials and civil society
actors. The conclusions summarize the main ﬁndings and dis-
cuss implications for future research on political conditionality
in dominant party regimes beyond Africa and donors other
than the EU.2. EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES
TOWARDS SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
The turn of the century brought about a qualitative shift in
the EU’s policies on supporting democratic reforms in Africa.
During the 1990s, the EU mainly relied on democracy aid and
negative conditionality in the form of sanctions (Article 96 of
the Cotonou Agreement) (Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2009; Crawford,
2001). However, sanctions merely constitute a reactive instru-
ment to respond to serious violations of human rights and
democratic principles; they are therefore used only in excep-
tional situations. Moreover, in the 1990s the volume of democ-
racy aid was still comparatively small in both absolute and
relative terms (Crawford, 2001).
In contrast to the 1990s, since the early 2000s the EU has
developed a range of instruments that allow it not only to
respond to imminent political crises but to support slight
political openings or prevent degradations in political liberal-
ization. In particular, reforms in the international aid system
have allowed the EU to considerably develop and expand its
instruments to support political reforms (see also Molenaers
et al., 2015; Koch, 2015). The EU has increasingly used aid
negotiations with recipient governments to make support
for political reforms a prominent issue in its relations with
African countries. Under the Cotonou Agreement that the
EU signed with the African, Caribbean, and Paciﬁc Group
of States (ACP) in 2000, progress on democratic reforms
has become an important criterion for the EU to decide upon
the allocation of aid funds provided through the European
Development Fund (EDF). Aid negotiations thus allow for
setting direct incentives for reforms (Beck & Conzelmann,
2004). Moreover, aid modalities such as budget support
allow the EU to engage in dialog on political reforms and
set incentives for reforms (Molenaers, 2012). Instruments
such as the governance incentive tranche that the EU intro-
duced in 2006 seek to set ﬁnancial incentives for African
countries to develop and commit to comprehensive gover-
nance action plans and discuss reform progress with the
EU (Hout, 2010; Molenaers & Nijs, 2009). The EU has con-
siderably increased the volume of democracy aid in absolute
and relative terms. 1 Donor-government aid coordination
dialogs, as they emerged in the context of the aid eﬀective-
ness agenda, allow the EU and other donors also to pressure
for regular exchanges, for instance on justice-sector reform or
the role of democratic oversight institutions. Moreover,
beyond its aid instruments, the EU strengthened political
dialog as one of the main pillars in its relations with ACPcountries (Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement) (Beck &
Conzelmann, 2004).
Research on the eﬀectiveness of the EU’s political condition-
ality in the neighborhood (Checkel, 2000; Schimmelfennig &
Sedelmeier, 2005; Van Hu¨llen, 2012), on the eﬀectiveness of
democratic sanctions (Blanchard & Ripsman, 2013; Portela,
2010), or on economic conditionality (Killick, 1997) concurs
that the willingness of the target government to engage with
the EU is a pre-condition for conditionality to work. This is
particularly relevant for the instruments that the EU has
developed during the past decade to support democratic
reforms in Africa. The implementation of most of the EU’s
democracy promotion instruments requires the active engage-
ment of African governments. Only if African governments
are willing to include debates on democratic reforms in polit-
ical and aid policy dialogs, to direct at least some parts of
overall development aid to support democratic reforms, to
include issues related to political reforms in their budget sup-
port negotiations and to discuss comprehensive governance
action plans with the EU, can these instruments eventually
contribute to political reforms.
But when would governments in dominant party regimes be
expected to engage with the EU in the implementation of
democracy promotion instruments? Building on basic assump-
tions about the logic of political survival in authoritarian
regimes, the following section focuses on the domestic politics
of dominant party systems in order to develop propositions
about the conditions under which these regimes have an inter-
est in opening up or closing down political spaces, and in
engaging with the EU on political reforms.3. EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES MEET
DOMESTIC POLITICS IN DOMINANT PARTY
REGIMES
Political leaders in dominant party regimes are conceived of
as rational and self-interested actors seeking to maximize their
chances of remaining in power—not too diﬀerent from their
counterparts in democracies. However, leaders in dominant
party systems do not remain in oﬃce through competitive elec-
tions where they would need to secure support from the major-
ity of the electorate. They therefore always fear being ousted.
Put simply, domestic politics in authoritarian regimes can be
conceived of as a political ‘game’ between the leadership,
members of the ruling elite (i.e., the ruling party and the secu-
rity apparatus) and the broader society (Bueno de Mesquita,
Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). To increase its chances
of remaining in power, the leadership needs to prevent, or
respond to challenges to its survival from inside or outside
the ruling elite.
Previous research on authoritarian regimes has identiﬁed
several ways in which the leadership’s political survival can
be challenged. No agreement exists among scholars which type
of challenge is ultimately more likely to threaten political sur-
vival (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Magaloni & Kricheli,
2010; Reuter & Gandhi, 2011). Moreover, ﬁndings in the liter-
ature are inconclusive whether dominant party systems are
more likely to be replaced by democracy (Hadenius &
Teorell, 2007) or another form of authoritarian rule
(Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010).
First, the leadership can be under threat from groups outside
the ruling elite, such as opposition parties and mass move-
ments (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 2004; Ulfelder,
2005). In Africa, for instance, mass movements and civil soci-
ety protests played an important role in regime liberalizations
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van de Walle, 1997). Second, persons inside the ruling elite,
such as individual members or factions of the ruling party,
can decide to defect and to challenge the leadership by present-
ing themselves as a political alternative (Magaloni, 2006;
Reuter & Gandhi, 2011; Svolik, 2012). In dominant party
regimes, elites within the ruling party who may choose to com-
pete with the incumbent may pose a great danger to political
survival, for instance during periods of economic crisis
(Reuter & Gandhi, 2011). Third, oﬃcials of the party or secu-
rity apparatus may decide to defect, but they may not directly
attempt to challenge the leadership. If that happens, it signals
to opponents and members of the ruling elite that the regime is
weak, possibly prompting further erosion of the support coali-
tion, which may eventually result in mass mobilization or may
trigger a split in the elite in the longer run.
For all three situations, elections constitute important
points in time. Defecting party members may use elections
to challenge the incumbent. In addition, mass protests often
arise as a result of incumbents stealing elections (Magaloni,
2006). Even though elections in dominant party systems are
not free and fair, winning elections with a high voter turnout
and an overwhelming majority is important for the leadership
to signal its supporters that it pays to remain loyal to the lead-
ership, and its opponents that their chances of gaining power
are limited (Magaloni, 2006; Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010, p.
129f.).
This article argues that the type of challenge the leadership
faces has at least two implications. In line with previous
research on authoritarian regimes, the article argues that chal-
lenges to political survival constitute deﬁning moments in the
life of the ruling party and can induce substantial changes in
survival strategies (Conrad, 2011; Reuter & Gandhi, 2011).
In addition, I expect that the way in which leaders are chal-
lenged inﬂuences the willingness of the leadership to engage
with the EU on democratic reforms, giving the EU more or
less leverage to foster political opening, or to limit political
closure.
The eﬀectiveness of EU conditionality in authoritarian
regimes is thus mitigated by two strategic games. One is played
between the government and (potential) challengers. The other
relates to the EU’s interaction with authoritarian govern-
ments. Both are brieﬂy explored in the following. (For an
overview of the arguments see Table 1 below.)Table 1. EU democracy promotion strategies meet dome(a) Strategic interaction between the government and (poten-
tial) challengers
Along with co-optation, coercion is one of the main strate-
gies of authoritarian leaders to increase their chances of
remaining in power (Wintrobe, 2001). Coercion can take var-
ious forms. Authoritarian regimes may use a variety of formal
and informal strategies to intimidate civil society organiza-
tions, reduce the freedom of media, opposition parties, or indi-
vidual regime critics (Davenport, 2007; Levitsky & Way,
2010). Coercion may be used as an instrument of sanction
against individuals (i.e., torture) or the broader society (i.e.,
restrictions in political rights and civil liberties) (Davenport,
2007). Governments can use high-intensity coercion (i.e., bru-
tal repression of protests such as recently on the Maidan
Square in the Ukraine) or low-intensity coercion (i.e., restric-
tions in freedom of media or imprisonment of individuals)
(Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 54ﬀ). Dominant party regimes are
expected to use diﬀerent strategies of coercion in response to
diﬀerent types of challenges to political survival (Conrad,
2011; Escriba`-Folch, 2013).
First, in response to mass mobilization and challenges from
the opposition outside of the ruling elite, the leadership is
likely to target coercion at the broader society and to severely
restrict political rights and civil liberties with a view to reduc-
ing the collective action capacities of opposition groups. If
mass mobilization escalates into full-ﬂedged mass protests,
dominant party regimes may even turn to use high-intensity
coercion. High-intensity coercion is costly for dominant party
regimes: it may have medium-term negative eﬀects on eco-
nomic development as citizens refuse to engage in economic
activities and international investments decline (Bueno de
Mesquita & Smith, 2010; Wintrobe, 2001). Dominant party
regimes would be expected to use high-intensity coercion as
a measure of last resort only in situations where
low-intensity coercion directed at the broader society has not
been successful and the leadership faces mass protests.
Second, it can be expected that in response to party splits,
governments would rely on low-intensity coercion and target
coercion directly at defecting members of the elite to limit their
chance of challenging the incumbent. For instance,
anti-corruption campaigns may be used to marginalize those
party members who induced a split in the party. Imprison-
ment, torture, or ‘disappearances’ may be used to silence indi-stic politics in authoritarian regimes Source: Author.
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combine strategies of low-intensity coercion targeted at indi-
viduals with strategies of low-intensity coercion targeted at
the broader society in order to limit the opportunities of defec-
tors to mobilize mass support. For instance, if former party
members challenge the incumbent at the ballot box, reductions
in press freedom, freedom of assembly, and spaces for opposi-
tion parties to campaign may limit the ability of defectors to
mobilize support.
Third, when members of the ruling party or security forces
defect and the ruling coalition is eroding but defectors do
not (yet) directly challenge the incumbent, governments are
also likely to rely on low-intensity coercion. The government
may also target low-intensity coercion mainly at those individ-
uals who choose to defect, while using low-intensity coercion
toward the broader society in order to reduce the chances of
the defectors to mobilize mass support. However, while in
both circumstances the strategy of using low-intensity coer-
cion may look quite similar to outside actors such as the
EU, the political leadership ﬁnds itself in a fundamentally dif-
ferent situation. Political leaders who respond to imminent
challenges to political survival from former members of the
ruling coalition perceive their situation to be quite vulnerable.
By contrast, political leaders who seek to prevent imminent
threats perceive themselves to be in a relatively secure position.
(b) Strategic interaction between the EU and governments in
dominant party regimes
The ways in which leaders in dominant party regimes are
challenged not only aﬀect their strategies of using coercion
but also their openness to engaging with the EU on political
reforms, giving the EU diﬀerent ways to supporting reforms.
When deciding whether to engage with the EU on political
reforms, governments in African dominant party regimes con-
sider if and to what extent cooperation with the EU increases
or reduces their chances of remaining in power. EU support
for democratic reforms is part of the EU’s overall ‘develop-
ment aid package’. It can be expected that governments in
dominant party regimes weigh the costs of engaging with the
EU in the implementation of democracy aid, political dialog
or aid policy dialogs related to political reforms against the
beneﬁts of receiving other forms of sizable and attractive
development aid (Cornell, 2012). However, I argue that the
political costs of engaging in the implementation of democracy
promotion instruments vary, depending on the type of chal-
lenge to political survival governments face (see left-hand col-
umn, Table 1 above).
First, in situations where the government faces mass oppo-
sition, engagement with the EU on political reforms produces
substantial costs and the government is least likely to engage.
In instances of mass opposition, even small steps toward polit-
ical liberalization and ceasing coercive measures that are direc-
ted at reducing the collective action capacities of the broader
society may immediately threaten political survival. In this
context, engaging with the EU in political dialog and the
implementation of democracy aid or other EU instruments
geared toward supporting democratic reforms and political
liberalization would be particularly risky for the government.
This was illustrated, for instance, when the Ukrainian Presi-
dent Yanukovych was ousted from oﬃce in February 2014,
just after having made subtle concessions to the opposition,
which were mediated by EU foreign ministers. In situations
where the government is confronted with mass mobilization,
the expectation is for the government not to engage on political
reforms at all, even if, in return, the EU provides sizable andattractive ﬁnancial incentives in the form of development aid
packages. ‘Not engaging’ on political reforms would imply
that governments do not engage in the implementation of
Article 8 political dialog, refuse to engage in aid policy dialogs
geared toward political reforms and refuse to engage in the
implementation of EU democracy aid.
Second, in situations where members of the ruling elite
decide to defect and openly challenge the leadership, coopera-
tion with the EU on democratic reforms is also likely to pro-
duce substantial costs. Yet, engagement on political reforms
with the EU is less costly here than in cases of mass mobiliza-
tion. Governments that target coercive measures mainly at
defecting members of the elite and to a lesser extent at the
broader society should have slightly more leeway to engage
with the EU on the implementation of democracy promotion
instruments geared toward promoting political liberalization.
In situations where members of the ruling elite decide to defect
and openly challenge the leadership, governments would
therefore be expected to be more likely to at least reluctantly
engage with the EU on democratic reforms, if the EU oﬀers
development aid or other economic beneﬁts in return. ‘Reluc-
tant engagement’ would imply that governments engage irreg-
ularly and at a low political level in Article 8 political dialog
and aid policy dialogs geared toward democratic reforms.
Moreover, governments would seek to limit the implementa-
tion of EU democracy aid to a minimum.
Finally, if members of the ruling elite defect but do not
choose to openly challenge the leadership, the government
has even more leeway to engage with the EU on democratic
reforms. While an erosion of the ruling elite may signal that
the regime is weak, only in the medium to longer term may
opponents seek to exploit this weakness, run in elections them-
selves, align with opposition groups, and mobilize mass oppo-
sition. The government has therefore more leeway to cease
coercive measures targeted at the broader society and to risk
small steps toward political liberalization which may be a
result of its engagement with the EU. In the case of an eroding
elite, dominant party regimes are therefore likely to actively
engage with the EU on political reforms—at least in the short
to medium term—if the EU provides sizable and attractive
development aid in return. ‘Active engagement’ would imply
that governments engage in Article 8 political dialog and aid
policy dialogs related to political reforms regularly and at a
high political level and they would actively engage in the
implementation of EU democracy aid.
This diﬀerential willingness of governments in dominant
party regimes to engage on political reforms creates entry
points for the EU to support political openings or counter
political closures. The instruments the EU has developed dur-
ing the past decade to support democratic reforms allow the
EU to exert higher or lower pressure on African governments
to incentivize reforms. Depending on the size of the ‘stick’ the
EU uses, its strategies can be conceived of as a continuum (see
Figure 1).
First, the EU can still use sanctions under Article 96 of the
Cotonou Agreement (Portela, 2010). The EU can decide to
withhold (parts of) its budget-support tranches, or re-direct
budget support to other aid modalities (Faust, Leiderer, &
Schmitt, 2012; Molenaers, 2012). If the EU decides to freeze
aid or trade preferences or to shift budget support to other
aid modalities, the political and economic costs for African
governments could be very high. This can be considered a
strategy of confrontation. Second, the EU can use a number
of smaller ‘sticks’, such as shifting aid funds. For instance,
re-allocating aid intended to support general elections may
not cause ﬁnancial diﬃculties for African governments, but
Confrontation Criticism Cooperation
sanctions, budget support  
suspensions, etc.
naming and shaming, 
shifting of aid funds, etc.
political and policy 
dialogues, democracy aid
Figure 1. The EU’s strategies to promote democratic reforms. Source: Author.
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the electoral process. Or the EU can use strategies of ‘naming
and shaming’. In public statements, for instance, it can voice
concern regarding violations of democratic principles or
human rights. These measures can be considered to be ele-
ments of a strategy of criticism. Third, the EU may be reluc-
tant to exert pressure but could, instead, merely rely on
political and aid-policy dialogs as well as democracy aid to
support reforms. This approach can be labeled a strategy of
cooperation.
The type of challenge to political survival faced by the gov-
ernment is expected to give the EU diﬀerential entry points to
promote political liberalization. In cases when the government
is confronted with mass opposition, one would expect that,
even if the EU exerts considerable pressure and uses a con-
frontational strategy, the government has very limited leeway
to engage. On the other hand, we would expect that in situa-
tions when the government is confronted with elite defections
or a gradual erosion of the elite, the government has more lee-
way to respond positively when the EU exerts pressure and
uses, for instance, a strategy of criticism. However, previous
research on the factors that inﬂuence the EU’s choice of strate-
gies would lead to the expectation that the EU has diﬃculties
making use of these ‘windows of opportunity’ (see right-hand
column, Table 1 above).
First of all, measures of high-intensity coercion are usually
very visible to outside actors. Open and strong repression sub-
stantially increases pressure on the EU and other donors to
use a confrontational approach. Other external relations
objectives and interests, for instance those related to the
EU’s economic, security or geo-strategic interests (Bo¨rzel &
Risse, 2009; Carbone, 2010; Ju¨nemann & Knodt, 2007;
Wetzel & Orbie, 2011) or development policy (Del Biondo,
2011), may considerably increase the costs to the EU of exert-
ing pressure, and therefore reduce its willingness to use sanc-
tions or suspend budget support. Yet, European public
opinion and criticism from civil society or the media would
be expected to pressure the EU into responding to outright
human rights violations (Hasenclever, 2001). Empirical evi-
dence suggests that donors indeed respond to high-intensity
coercion by withdrawing aid (Hyde & Boulding, 2008).
By contrast, the various forms of low-intensity coercion
leave the EU institutions considerably more discretionary
power on which strategy to use, as they face less pressure from
the European public or EU member states. However, despite
attempts to more strongly include political economy analysis
in decision-making processes (Unsworth, 2009), some of the
authoritarian regimes’ ‘menus of manipulation’ (Schedler,
2002) are diﬃcult for outside actors to read. Particularly in
dominant party regimes that develop a fac¸ade of democratic
institutions, it is hard for the EU to decide whether these
regimes are in a transition process toward democracy or are
stabilizing authoritarian rule (Ottaway, 2003). During periods
of low-intensity coercion, the EU would therefore merely be
expected to revert to a strategy of criticism or cooperation.
In sum, the type of challenge to political survival that gov-
ernments in dominant party regimes face does not only aﬀect
their strategies of using coercion, but also their openness toengaging with the EU on political reforms. This domestic
‘game’ between the government and (potential) opponents
thereby gives the EU diﬀerential entry points to support polit-
ical reforms. Yet, due to conﬂicting policy interests, pressure
from domestic public opinion or challenges to ‘read’ the
‘menus of manipulation’ in dominant party systems—factors
that are well established in research on the EU’s choice of
democracy promotion instruments—the EU has diﬃculties
making use of this dynamic to support reforms. The following
section uses Ethiopia and Rwanda as a plausibility probe to
illustrate these arguments.4. EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGIES MEET
DOMESTIC POLITICS IN DOMINANT PARTY SYS-
TEMS: RWANDA AND ETHIOPIA
Ethiopia and Rwanda are most similar with regard to fac-
tors that are generally identiﬁed in the literature as aﬀecting
the survival strategies of authoritarian regimes and their will-
ingness to engage with external actors on political reforms:
regime type and dependence on the EU. At the same time, sub-
stantial variance over time and between both countries exists
regarding the type of challenge to political survival that both
governments face as well as their strategies of using coercion
and their openness to engaging with the EU on political
reforms, allowing me to explore how domestic politics aﬀect
both governments’ willingness to engage with the EU.
Ethiopia and Rwanda can both be classiﬁed as dominant
party regimes with a relatively broad support coalition. In
both countries, political life is controlled by a ruling party that
is strongly entrenched in power. The Ethiopian People’s Revo-
lutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has dominated Ethio-
pian politics since it overthrew the militarist Marxist Derg
regime in the early 1990s (Abbink, 2006). In Rwanda, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has dominated political and
economic developments since the genocide in 1994 (Beswick,
2010). Both countries score similarly low on political rights
and civil liberties according to indices such as Freedom
House. 2 One would therefore expect that both are less likely
to use high-intensity coercion than other types of authoritar-
ian regimes (Escriba`-Folch & Wright, in press). Moreover,
one would expect that for both engaging on political reforms
with the EU produces similarly high costs (Cornell, 2012).
Both countries are similarly dependent on the EU. Aid
accounted for 14% or more of Ethiopia’s and Rwanda’s gross
national income during 2000 and 2010. The EU has been one of
their largest donors, providing about one fourth of Ethiopia’s
and Rwanda’s overall aid during 2000 and 2012 (OECD, 2013).
Ethiopia and Rwanda have little access to ‘easy’ revenues such
as natural resources. Moreover, both experienced considerable
economic growth during the past decade; growth rates aver-
aged 7% and 10% respectively. For both countries, the EU is
(still) their largest trading partner and important source of
investments. One would therefore expect that it is in the interest
of both to engage with the EU on political reforms, even if this
engagement produces costs. On the other hand, the role of both
governments in regional UN peacekeeping operations and the
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factors, also give them some room for maneuver in engaging
with the EU. Ethiopia’s geo-strategic position on the Horn of
Africa gives it some leverage in engaging with the EU (Fraser
& Whitﬁeld, 2009). Similarly, Rwanda has been able to use
Western feelings of guilt for not intervening in Rwanda during
the genocide in 1994 to retain considerable independence from
donors, despite being dependent on aid (Hayman 2009). More-
over, both governments have sought to actively engage in UN
peacekeeping operation as well as the aid eﬀectiveness agenda,
and have used these agendas to increase their independence
from the EU and other donors (Furtado & Smith 2009;
Hayman 2009).
These considerable similarities between Ethiopia and
Rwanda allow focusing on how the type of challenge each
government faces aﬀects their survival strategies and their will-
ingness to engage with the EU on democratic reforms during
2000 and 2012.
(a) Rwanda
The example of Rwanda shows how governments in domi-
nant party regimes use low-intensity coercion to reduce threats
from defecting elites who directly (2000–04) or indirectly
(2005–12) challenge the incumbent. Moreover, it shows how,
due to elite defections, cooperation on political reforms pro-
duces costs, while giving the government a certain amount
of leeway to engage with the EU.
(i) Why was the government reluctant to engage with the EU
during 2000–04?
After the genocide in 1994, the EU strengthened its relations
with Rwanda and quickly became one of Rwanda’s largest
donors. In the early 2000s the EU sought to engage with the
Rwandan government on political reforms during a period
of growing opposition and relative regime instability. Almost
ten years after the genocide, the ﬁrst presidential and parlia-
mentary elections and a referendum for the new constitution
were scheduled for 2003 (Reyntjens, 2004). The government
had re-established domestic security and its monopoly on
power (Prunier, 2009). External security threats from ge´no-
cidaires who found refuge in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) were substantially reduced after Rwanda’s mil-
itary interventions in the DRC in the late 1990s (Prunier,
2009). Basic economic development had resumed by then
(Marysse, Ansoms, & Cassimon, 2007).
Yet, ahead of the 2003 elections, President Kagame faced
mounting opposition. Several members of the ‘government
of unity’ had defected, suggesting that the Rwandan leader-
ship’s attempts to broaden its support base were failing
(Reyntjens, 2004; Waugh, 2004). Some of these former govern-
ment and party members went into exile; others joined the
domestic opposition, particularly the Democratic Republican
Front (MDR)—the largest opposition party (Reyntjens,
2004; Waugh, 2004). The former president of the ‘government
of national unity’, Bizimungu, decided to openly challenge
Kagame and to run in the presidential elections (Reyntjens,
2004). The Rwandan government targeted several measures
of low-intensity coercion at the defecting members of the elite.
In order to reduce their chances of challenging the government
in the elections, the government banned the MDR and
arrested ex-President Bizimungu. Moreover, press freedom
and the space for civil society organizations were limited fur-
ther to reduce the defectors’ chances of mobilizing support
and eﬀectively challenging the government (Beswick, 2010;
Reyntjens, 2004).In response to these measures of low-intensity coercion, the
EU used a strategy of criticism and exerted some pressure on
the government to open up political spaces. The EU criticized
the restricting of political spaces for civil society and the oppo-
sition ahead of the 2003 elections and decided to withhold aid
funds earmarked to support the elections (Kimonyo,
Twagiramungu, & Kayumba, 2004). During the EDF
mid-term review in 2004, the EU argued that it would not
increase overall development aid as a result of the Rwandan
government’s limited progress on political reforms
(European Union, 2004). Beyond these material disincentives,
the EU criticized the political situation in several public
statements, for instance in autumn 2004 when the Rwandan
Parliament issued a report on ‘divisionism’ that was used to
limit spaces for civil society. 3 In addition, the EU sought to
use democracy aid funds, political and aid policy dialogs
to establish some cooperation on political reforms with the
Rwandan government (European Commission & Rwanda,
2002, 2007).
When the EU urged the Rwandan government to cease
coercive measures and allow for political liberalization, the
Rwandan government faced a dilemma. On the one hand,
the EU was one of the largest donors, providing about one
fourth of all aid funds. 4 The government was clearly in need
of aid funds to strengthen political survival: after the end of
the transition phase, economic growth and public goods pro-
vision became more important sources of legitimacy for the
government (Marysse et al., 2007). On the other hand, active
engagement with the EU on political reforms and a softening
of the media law or more spaces for civil society organizations
could have had direct negative eﬀects for the regime’s stability.
In this context, the Rwandan government chose to reluctantly
engage with the EU on political reforms. It agreed to engage in
a formal Article 8 political dialog at a high political level and
with a comprehensive agenda only in 2004 (European
Commission & Rwanda, 2007). The government remained
very hesitant to engage in aid policy dialog talks with a speciﬁc
focus on political reforms (Hayman, 2006). Moreover, the
Rwandan government only reluctantly agreed to implement
democracy aid targeted for instance at the rehabilitation of
the parliament, the 2003 elections and transitional justice
(European Commission & Rwanda, 2002, 2007).
(ii) Why has the Rwandan government actively engaged with the
EU during 2005–12?
In contrast to the early 2000s, during 2005 and 2012 the gov-
ernment experienced a period of relative stability, with few
challenges from opponents from inside or outside of the ruling
coalition. Domestic opposition was substantially weakened
after the MDR was banned and after there was a crackdown
on independent civil society organizations in 2004
(Reyntjens, 2004). During the 2008 parliamentary elections,
the government faced hardly any opposition. On the contrary,
some observers suggest that the government actually won 98%
of the votes, but decided to downplay the oﬃcial results to
76% to appear less autocratic (Longman, 2011). Since 2010,
several high-level members of the RPF and the security forces
have defected (some going into exile), but did little to directly
challenge the ruling party (EIU, 2011). In the 2010 presidential
elections, Kagame faced very weak opposition and was easily
re-elected with 98% of the votes (Beswick, 2010). In light of
few challenges to political survival, the Rwandan government
used informal tactics such as arresting, ‘disappearing’ or mur-
der of defecting members of the RPF and security forces. At
the same time, legal measures such as the laws on ‘genocide
ideology’, ‘divisionism’ and a new media law were used to limit
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society (Beswick, 2010).
Even though the Rwandan government employed a range of
measures of low-intensity coercion to limit the space for the
media, civil society and the opposition during 2005 and 2012,
the EU adopted merely a strategy of cooperation and exerted
little pressure on the government. Instead, by increasing devel-
opment aid and through its choice of aid modalities, the EU
signaled to the government that it generally viewed its political
situation as positive. In 2007, the EU rewarded the government
for its compliance with the requirements of the governance
incentive tranche with a 30% aid increase; the highest possible
tranche, received only by ﬁve countries. 5During the 2009 EDF
mid-term review, the EU increased its overall development aid
by another 30% (€89 million). The head of the EU delegation in
Kigali, Michel Arrion, justiﬁed the decision by referring to the
‘[. . .] exemplary progress Rwanda made in recent years in good
governance, sustainable development and the ﬁght against
poverty and hunger’ (European Union, 2012). In contrast to
the early 2000s, the EU also has not used public statements
to criticize measures of low-intensity coercion. Ahead of the
parliamentary and presidential elections in 2008 and 2010,
while private media, civil society, and opposition parties faced
diﬃculties campaigning, and international nongovernmental
organizations vocally criticized the limiting of political space,
the EU did not publicly express concern. 6
Due to relative regime stability during 2005 and 2012, coop-
eration with the EU on political reforms produced less costs
for the Rwandan government than in the early 2000s. More-
over, the EU continued to be one of Rwanda’s largest donors,
providing about one fourth of total aid. 7 During 2005 and
2012 the Rwandan government was therefore increasingly
active in engaging with the EU on political reforms. It regu-
larly engaged in high-level Article 8 political dialog and agreed
to discuss sensitive issues such as the death penalty and laws
on genocide ideology or divisionism during these dialog meet-
ings (European Commission & Rwanda, 2007). It agreed to
regularly address political reforms during various aid policy
dialogs, such as meetings to discuss assistance on reforms to
the justice system. 8 The government agreed to allocate and
implement democracy aid to support the justice sector, the
media, the parliament, as well as the 2008 parliamentary and
2010 presidential elections (European Commission, 2009;
European Commission & Rwanda, 2007). Moreover, the gov-
ernment asked the EU and other donors to jointly conduct a
governance assessment. Even if the annual review process
has been quite diﬃcult and led to considerable tensions
between the government and donors, it is still noteworthy that
Rwanda is the only African country that has invited donors to
jointly analyze the governance situation. 9
(iii) Why did the government engage with the EU during the
2012 crisis?
In the summer of 2012, a report published by a United
Nations (UN) group of experts accused the Rwandan govern-
ment of backing rebel movements in the DRC. We have seen
that during the past few years, the Rwandan regime’s support
coalition has been eroding; since 2010, members of the Rwan-
dan security apparatus have been defecting (EIU, 2011). Even
if President Kagame was not openly challenged in the elec-
tions, their departure puts pressure on the leadership to main-
tain the loyalty of the security apparatus. As there are few
sources of easy domestic revenues in Rwanda, allowing the
military to exploit natural resources in the DRC may help to
maintain support from key segments of the security apparatus.
Indeed, observers point to Rwanda’s economic rather thansecurity concerns to explain its support of rebel movements
in the DRC (Huening, 2013; Prunier, 2009, p. 322ﬀ).
In response to the ﬁndings of the UN group of experts’
report, the EU and other donors fundamentally altered their
strategy and adopted a strategy of confrontation. In September
2012, the EU decided to postpone decisions regarding new aid
commitments for the transport sector (€40 million) and for
budget support (€30 million). As a result of pressure from
EU member states, the World Bank and the African Develop-
ment Bank also decided to withhold their signatures from new
aid agreements for several months. 10 The EU and other
donors eventually did not suspend aid, but channeled funds
through other aid modalities.
Since aid still accounts for about 50% of Rwanda’s budget,
the decision of the EU and other donors to withhold funds put
the government in a precarious situation (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2013). However, since the Rwandan govern-
ment did not face substantial challenges from domestic oppo-
nents during the 2012 crisis, it had enough leeway to cooperate
with the EU on political reforms and it continued to engage.
The government maintained a regular, high-level Article 8
political dialog and continued to implement aid projects
related to democratic reforms. 11 It continued to engage with
the EU in aid dialogs that address political reforms. 12
(b) Ethiopia
The case of Ethiopia shows how threats to political survival
from a split in the ruling party (2001) and mass opposition
(2005) substantially alter dominant party regimes’ survival
strategies. While Ethiopia has been quite reluctant to engage
with the EU on political reforms throughout the entire decade,
these diﬀerential challenges gave the government more leeway
to engage with the EU in the early 2000s than after 2005.
(i) Why was the government reluctant to engage with the EU in
the early 2000s?
As in Rwanda, support for political reforms became a prior-
ity in the EU’s cooperation with Ethiopia at the turn of the
century. As in Rwanda, the Ethiopian government also faced
a period of instability in the early 2000s. After the end of the
war with Eritrea, a split in the Central Committee of the ruling
party put substantial pressure on the leadership (Tadesse &
Young, 2003). The leadership used diﬀerent forms of
low-intensity coercion. It purged the party and security appa-
ratus to rebuild support. Corruption charges were brought
forward against former high-level party cadres. In addition,
the government further limited spaces for civil society and
the media in order to make it more diﬃcult for defectors to
mobilize support (Abbink, 2006). Only just before the 2005
elections did the Ethiopian government again perceive itself
as being in a relatively secure position and allowed a slight
opening up of political spaces for opposition parties, civil soci-
ety, and the media (Abbink, 2006, p. 181).
As in the case of Rwanda, the EU used a strategy of criti-
cism in the early 2000s in response to the government’s mea-
sures of low-intensity coercion. The EU exerted some
pressure on the Ethiopian government and urged it to open
up political spaces and limit coercive measures. The EU issued
several statements criticizing the human rights situation. 13
Moreover, in the EDF mid-term review, the EU made clear
that the Ethiopian government could only receive more devel-
opment aid if the political situation improved. 14 At the same
time, the EU sought to use democracy aid, political dialog and
aid policy dialogs to establish an active cooperation with the
Ethiopian government on political reforms.
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to engage with the EU on political reforms in the early 2000s.
On the one hand, output legitimacy had become more impor-
tant for the government after the end of the war with Eritrea in
2000 (Tadesse & Young, 2003). The EU was one of the largest
donors to Ethiopia, providing about 20% of total aid 15 and
thereby supporting the government’s output legitimacy. At
the same time, granting more spaces for civil society and the
opposition may have been exploited by defecting members
of the ruling party. In this context, the Ethiopian government
was reluctant to engage in regular high-level Article 8 political
dialog, aid policy dialogs and the implementation of democ-
racy aid projects (DAG, 2005; Ethiopia & European
Commission, 2008). 16
The Ethiopian government only became more willing to
engage with the EU in the run-up to the 2005 elections. Obser-
vers argue that the government again perceived itself in a rel-
atively secure position ahead of the elections and therefore
allowed a slight opening up of political spaces (Abbink,
2006). In parallel, the government also became more active
in engaging with the EU on the implementation of democracy
promotion instruments. Just before the elections the govern-
ment ﬁnally agreed to engage in aid policy dialogs with a focus
on political reforms (DAG, 2005), as well as moving ahead
with the implementation of democracy aid targeted at the
human rights commission, the judiciary, and a civil society
fund (Ethiopia & European Commission, 2008).
(ii) Why was the Ethiopian government unwilling to engage in
2005?
The 2005 elections marked a watershed event for the Ethio-
pian regime’s stability and its cooperation with the EU. The
relatively strong election results of the opposition parties
caught the EPRDF by surprise (Abbink, 2006; Vaughan,
2011). Violent confrontations between the government and
opposition broke out when the latter contested the ﬁnal results
and claimed to have won the elections. About 200 people were
killed and many members of the opposition were imprisoned
(Abbink, 2006; Vaughan, 2011). In 2005, the Ethiopian gov-
ernment thus faced a period of instability and perceived a fun-
damental threat to its survival that the Rwandan government
never experienced during 2000 and 2012.
During the crisis the EU tried to mediate (Abbink, 2006). At
the same time the EU and other donors used a strategy of con-
frontation and put substantial pressure on the Ethiopian gov-
ernment to reconcile with the opposition and to release
political prisoners. As the crisis accelerated, the EU threatened
to suspend the remaining €95 million budgetary support and
postponed a decision regarding a €155 million aid agreement
for transport infrastructure (Ethiopia & European
Commission, 2008). Eventually, the EU decided not to reduce
aid but to redirect budgetary support to other aid modalities
with stronger earmarking and monitoring procedures.
Even when the EU threatened to withhold some of its aid,
the Ethiopian government remained unwilling to comply with
the EU’s and other donors’ requests and to modify its
approach to the crisis. Moreover, the government refused to
cooperate with the EU and other donors and froze political
and aid policy dialogs (DAG, 2006). 17 On the one hand, the
EU’s decision to use aid as a lever for change put the Ethio-
pian government in a precarious situation and exposed it to
a great deal of uncertainty—at least in the short to medium
term (Bergthaller & Ku¨blbo¨ck, 2009). At the same time, com-
plying with EU demands and engaging on political reforms,
was perceived by the Ethiopian government to produce immi-
nent costs for regime stability. During the election crisis thegovernment viewed engaging with the EU on political reforms
as a direct threat to political survival: in an open letter, Meles
Zenawi criticized the EU observer mission for siding with the
opposition and thereby encouraging protests and contributing
to fueling the crisis. 18
While the EU’s approach toward Ethiopia in 2005 was not
very diﬀerent from the EU’s strategy toward Rwanda in 2012,
diﬀerences in both governments’ willingness to continue
engaging with the EU can mainly be explained by the diﬀerent
types of domestic threat to political survival that each govern-
ment faced. In contrast to the situation in Rwanda in 2012, the
2005 crisis constituted a fundamental challenge to the Ethio-
pian government, where engaging with the EU on political
reforms was perceived by the government to directly threaten
political survival, giving it little room to maneuver to engage
with the EU.
(iii) Why has the government been very reluctant to engage
during 2006–10?
In response to the 2005 crisis, the Ethiopian government
restricted political spaces to prevent further mass mobiliza-
tion. The elections had shown that the mobilizing potential
of the opposition was quite high. In the aftermath of the crisis,
the Ethiopian government used various means of low-intensity
coercion targeted at the broader society to limit spaces for the
opposition to organize (Abbink, 2011; Vaughan, 2011). In
2009, the government introduced a series of new laws on the
media, terrorism and civil society that substantially limited
spaces for the opposition (Abbink, 2011; Vaughan, 2011). At
the same time, the government sought to considerably expand
the ruling party and strengthen the loyalty of party members.
Moreover, economic growth and public goods provision
became even more important as foundations of the regime’s
legitimacy (Vaughan, 2011).
During 2006 and 2010, the EU again used a strategy of crit-
icism, pressuring Ethiopia to limit measures of low-intensity
coercion, using general aid and aid modalities to signal to
the government that it did not approve of the political situa-
tion. In contrast to Rwanda, the EU allocated only a
medium-size governance incentive tranche to Ethiopia in
2006. 19 It argued that budget support could only be resumed
following improvements in the political situation, even though
Ethiopia met all other eligibility criteria (Ethiopia & European
Commission, 2008). In the mid-term review for the 10th EDF,
the EU justiﬁed its decision not to increase EDF funds by
referring to the diﬃcult political situation. 20 Moreover, the
EU made several public statements, criticizing the closure of
an independent journal, raising concerns that the new civil
society law substantially limits spaces for civil society, and that
the 2010 parliamentary elections did not meet international
standards. 21 At the same time, the EU sought to use democ-
racy aid, political dialog, and aid policy dialogs to establish an
active engagement on political reforms with the Ethiopian
government.
However, in contrast to Rwanda during 2005 and 2012, the
Ethiopian government remained reluctant to engage with the
EU on political reforms during 2006 and 2010. After the elec-
tion crisis, the importance of output legitimacy further
increased (Abbink, 2011; Vaughan, 2011) and the EU contin-
ued to be one of Ethiopia’s largest donors, providing about
20% of Ethiopia’s aid. 22 At the same time, cooperating on
political reforms could have produced substantial costs for
the government. Some measures of low-intensity coercion such
as the 2009 civil society law were at least partly introduced
with the objective to limit international support for potential
challengers to a minimum (Vaughan, 2011), indicating that
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reforms. In this context, the Ethiopian government remained
reluctant to engage in the implementation of democracy aid,
political dialog, and aid policy dialogs related to political
reforms (Ethiopia & European Commission, 2008). 23 Ethio-
pia hesitated a long time before agreeing with donors on con-
crete political reform objectives as part of its development and
poverty-reduction strategy papers. 24 The government sought
to direct democracy aid toward strengthening the capacities
and eﬃciency of democratic institutions (i.e., the parliament
or human rights commission) rather than empowering them
to fulﬁll their role of holding the government accountable
(Ethiopia & European Union, 2009). 25 For the 2010 elections,
the government hesitated to invite another EU observer mis-
sion to monitor the election process. It ﬁnally accepted, but
decided not to allow the observer mission to present its ﬁnal
results in Addis Ababa, which has never happened before in
the history of EU election observer missions and considerably
limited the EU’s scope for using the report to inﬂuence domes-
tic debate in Ethiopia. 26
(iv)Why has the government again become more forthcoming to
engage after 2010?
Against the background of the 2005 events, the 2010 parlia-
mentary elections presented a litmus test for the government.
Winning elections with an overwhelming majority was partic-
ularly important in signaling to regime opponents and mem-
bers of the ruling elite that the EPRDF had regained its
strength (Abbink, 2011; Vaughan, 2011). Eventually, the elec-
tions secured the Ethiopian government a landslide victory:
the EPRDF won all but two seats in parliament, indicating
that the regime had indeed regained much of its stability
(Vaughan, 2011).
In the absence of substantial pressure from the opposition
after the elections, the Ethiopian government has again
become more forthcoming in engaging on political reforms
with the EU. Article 8 political dialog, for instance, has again
taken place more regularly and has involved a broader range
of government ministers and not merely the prime minister
and minister of foreign aﬀairs. 27 Moreover, the Ethiopian
government has again become more forthcoming in its engage-
ment in aid-policy dialogs related to political reforms and
implementation of democracy aid projects. 28Table 2. EU democracy promotion strategies me
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The EU and other donors face tough choices when engaging
with dominant party systems such as Ethiopia and Rwanda.
While dominant party regimes have strongly entrenched them-
selves in power in both countries, both have also witnessed
substantial economic growth and made progress on poverty
reduction. In both cases the EU has sought to combine devel-
opment aid, democracy aid, and dialog to support political lib-
eralization. However, these two governments have responded
quite diﬀerently toward the EU’s demands for engaging on
political reforms, giving the EU diﬀerent entry points to sup-
port reforms. Whereas the Rwandan government willingly
and at times proactively engaged with the EU on political
reforms, the Ethiopian government was quite reluctant and
sometimes even unwilling to engage (see Table 2).
The article explained this diﬀerence in the willingness of the
Ethiopian and Rwandan governments to engage with the EU
by shedding light on the interaction between the government
and (potential) opponents in authoritarian regimes. The article
argued that governments that are challenged by mass opposi-
tion are more likely to target coercion at the broader society
and to use high-intensity coercion and are unwilling to engage
on political reforms. On the other hand, governments that are
challenged by elite defection rely on low-intensity coercion tar-
geted particularly at the groups and individuals who defect
and are more willing to engage with the EU on political
reforms, if the EU oﬀers attractive development-aid packages
in return. Finally, if the ruling coalition erodes, but defecting
members of the elite do not directly challenge the incumbent,
governments of dominant party regimes may even engage very
actively on political reforms with the EU.
Furthermore, the empirical analysis has shown that despite
reforms of the EU’s democracy promotion instruments during
the past decade, the EU apparently remains ill-equipped to
respond to this dynamic between the government and (poten-
tial) opponents in dominant party regimes. The EU can draw
on a number of instruments to set incentives for liberalization.
Yet, the case studies illustrate that the EU is not very strategic
in applying these instruments. The EU uses negative condition-
ality to respond to situations where the government faces sub-
stantial threats to its survival, making it very costly to engage.
Whereas the EU is under strong (public) pressure to react, inet domestic politics in Rwanda and Ethiopia
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94 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthese situations it is most diﬃcult for governments to positively
respond toEUpressure. In contrast, the EU refrains from exert-
ing pressure during periods of relative regime stability, thereby
giving away opportunities to support political openings.
These ﬁndings have implications for future academic
research as well as for policy-makers. The article shows that
the domestic logic of political survival in dominant party sys-
tems has important consequences for what the EU and other
donors can achieve with political conditionality at a certain
point in time. Academic research on political conditionality,
as well as debates among policy-makers, have mostly been
concerned with ‘exceptional’ situations where authoritarian
regimes use high-intensity coercion as a measure of last resort
to secure political survival, and where the EU and other
donors use sanctions or budget support suspensions to
respond to imminent political crises. The results presented
here conﬁrm the ﬁndings in previous research that the EU is
under considerable domestic pressure to react in these situa-
tions and that expectations on what conditionality can achieve
in these situations have to be modest.
More importantly, the analysis in this article strongly sug-
gests that policy-makers and academics should pay moreattention to periods when the ruling elite splits or when mem-
bers of the ruling elite defect and when governments use
low-intensity coercion to minimize challenges to political sur-
vival. While research on authoritarian regimes provides inter-
esting insights into the dynamics between the government and
opponents during these periods, the implications for the eﬀec-
tiveness of political conditionality have rarely been explored.
In these situations, donors may have considerable room to
maneuver in deciding which strategy to use, as they face low
pressure from their own domestic constituencies to revert to
sanctions or budget-support suspensions, but could instead
rely on smaller ‘carrot and stick’ incentives to encourage polit-
ical openings or prevent degradations in political liberaliza-
tion. Moreover, this article has shown that during periods
when the ruling elite splits or members of the ruling elite
defect, governments are more likely to accept democracy
aid, engage in dialog, and allow for space for civil society,
media, or opposition parties which may contribute to increas-
ing the chances that these regimes transition to democracy in
the longer run. Future research should thus focus more
strongly on these periods, not only for dominant party regimes
in Africa but also beyond and for donors other than the EU.NOTES1. According to statistics from the OECD Development Assistance
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